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Budgeting in State Government: The Case of South Carolina * 
GARY H. BROOKS 
Uni.versity of Mississippi 
JOHN R. DEMPSEY 
College of Charleston 
A budget is, most basically, a statement of planned expenditures that commits 
financial resources to the proposed activities of the person or institution making the 
budget. Since budgets normally must be designed to remain within the limits of 
available resources , the making of budgets necessarily involves the making of choices. 
In cases where the cost of proposed activities exceeds the resources available for 
allocation , some of those activities may have to be curtai led or eliminated. Often the 
·wants' of the budget-makers must be separated from legitimate needs, and expendi-
tures for the former elimin ated , or postponed until additional sources of income can be 
obtained. When the shortage of resources is severe, even legitimate needs may 
sometimes have to be ordered, and those needs with a lower order of urgency given a 
relatively sma ller share of the availab le money. 
Budgeting in the public sector involves all of these difficulties. As agents of the 
public in the allocation of public funds, government budget-makers must distribute 
resources among competing claims in a manner that is both financially sound and 
politically palatable. When budgetary claims exceed the resources available, the job of 
the government budget-maker is a difficult one indeed. Though the increasing ly 
"uncontrollable" nature of government budgets may have reduced the policy formula-
tion role of budget-makers in recent years , 1 a government's budget is still the best 
place to look for its answer to Harold Lasswell's question, "Who gets what, when, and 
how?" 2 A government's budget tells us, in graphic form, how that government's 
priorities have been estab lished. In Aaron Wildavsky's terms, "If one asks, 'Who ge ts 
what the government has to give?', then the answers for a moment in time are recorded 
in the budget." 3 
This study deals with the budgetary process in South Caro lina, and examines the 
financial and political dynamics of the way that state's budget is made. In one sense , of 
course , such a narrow focus limits our discussion and makes us reluctant to general ize 
about our findings. The single case study approach, however, has its advantages. By 
focusing on South Carolina, we deal with a classic budgeting cho ice situation. Unlike 
the federal government, South Carolina is prohibited (by Article X, Section 2 of the 
State Constitution) from engaging in deficit spending. It s budget makers, then, are 
• An earlier version of this paper was presen ted at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the South Carolina Political 
Science Association. 
1 In recent years, increasingly large percentages of government budgets have become "immune' from the 
control of the formal budgetary (or appropriations) process. This has resulted from the fact that an ever- larger 
portion of government budgets is currently being allotted to entitlement programs, retirement payments to 
public employees. and other budget items whose costs are determined by a combination of authorizing 
legislation and demographics. In the federal budget for fiscal year 1976, it is estimated that seventy-five percent 
of the expendjtures are 'uncontro llable' in this sense (up from sixty percent in 1967), and a recent Budget and 
Control Board estimate indicated tl1at approximate ly fifty percent of the state's budget is committed in this 
manner. 
2 Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What , When, 011d How? (New York: Peter Smith, 1950). 
3 Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little , Brown and Co. , 1964), p. 4. 
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faced with the hardest of political choices - reconciling citizen claims for finite public 
resources . Unlike the federal government , South Carolina can not borrow money from 
its citizens 4 to create budget deficits and thus give itself'room' to move in attempting to 
mediate competing requests for budget dollars. The climate created by this situation is 
one in which an extra dollar given to claim (or agency) A necessitates that a dollar be 
taken away from claim (or agency ) B. The political volatility of this situation is obvious. 
Another advantage to the single state study is the opportunity it affords to examine 
the subject in depth , and to make the kinds of year-to-year and agency-to-agency 
comparisons that can be extremely useful, but are often impractical in studies oflarger 
scope. The questions posed by this study , in fact, lend themselves to exploration in the 
single state format . Before beginning a discussion of those questions , a brief discuss .ion 
of the mechanical and chronological aspects of South Carolina's budgetary process is in 
order. 
The Budget-Making Process 
Though a host of popular , political , flscal, and financial factors converge on , and 
ultimately affect the South Carolina budget , this analysis focuses on the three major 
actors in the process: the executive departments and agencies making budget requests , 
the State Budget and Control Board , and the State Legislature. For analytical pur-
poses , it is best to view the executive departments as claimants in the budgetary 
process - each petitioning the state , on behalf of their programs and constituencies , 
for what they feel is their rightful share of budget dollars. The Budget and Control 
Board (BCB) and the legislature should be considered budget-makers , though our 
analysis will reveal that the executive departments , by adoption of certain strategies , 
can themselves exert control over their budget shares and are in at least an indirect 
sense , 'decision-makers ' in matters of state budgeting. 
In July of each year , South Carolina 's executive department heads and their 
respective budget officers are called to a meeting hosted by BCB, where revenue 
projections for the upcoming year are discussed and technical instructions are issued to 
the departments for the preparation of their budgets , which must themselves be 
submitted to BCB by September 15. Each department's budget request must include 
that department's organization chart and a description of its activities. Its budget 
request for the upcoming year must obviously be included , as must comparative 
figures for the two previous fiscal years. Since South Carolina does not practice 
'zero-based' budgeting , only that portion of the budget which represents an increase 
over last year 's appropriation tends to be justified and defended in detail. 
Behveen September 15 and the end of the calendar year , the financial fate of the 
state's executive departments is in the hands of the Budget and Control Board. The 
South Carolina Budget and Control Board has an impressive array of formal powers. It 
is unique in the structure of South Carolina government in the sense that it 'belongs' to 
both the executive and legislative branches. Its members include the Governor (its 
chairman ), the State Treasurer , the Comptroller General (both of whom are elected 
officials) and the respective chairmen of the House Committee on Ways and Means and 
the Senate Committee on Finance. The Board's Executive Secretary, the State Au-
ditor, supervises the professional staff. 
4 The State Government of South Carolina is empowered to 'borrow' money for capital improvements . No 
personal services, operatingt'Osts. etc ., can be paid for with these borrowed monies . Additionally , Section 20of 
the General Appropriations Act of 1975-76 places a five percent limit on the portion of the state 's budget which 
can be spent on debt servic e. Thus the state is doubly limited : borrowing can be undertaken only to finance 
capital improvements , and it must be limited to an amount small enough so that debt service constitutes less 
than five percent of the state's budget. 
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Like its counterpart on the federa l leve l, the Office of Management and Budget-
ing, 5 BCB has the responsibility of screening, pruning, and coordinating the executive 
deparhnents' budget requests prior to their submission to the legislature. This is 
accomplished in open session and in staff consultation between September 15 and the 
end of each calendar year. BCB also has responsibility for ensuring that departmental 
budgets · are prepared in the proper manner , and for making the estimated revenue 
predictions necessary to produce a 'balanced' budget. 
To accomplish its many tasks, BCB is split into six Divisions , the most important of 
which , for budgetary puq)oses, are the Finance Division and the Research/Statistical 
Division. 6 Very briefly it is the re ponsibility of the Research/Statistical Division to 
estimate revenues for the upcoming fiscal year, and of the Finance Division to assist 
the BCB members in preparing the actual budget document in accord with the 
estimated revenues. Phrased another way, the Research/Statistical Division sets the 
parameters of debate by defining the projected size of the 'pie,· and, once the size of the 
'pie' is determined , the Finance Division assists the Board members in 'slicing' it up, or 
setting the state 's financial priorities. 
Once BCB has received the deparhnents' budget requests, heard justifications of 
those requests in open session, and (assisted by professional staff members from the 
Finance and Research/Statistical Divisions) made its decisions as to how the states 
anticipated revenues are to be allocated , the budget document itself is printed and 
presented to the House of Representatives , where it is referred to the Committee on 
Ways and Means. Unlike the federal budget, which is always divided into a number of 
appropriations bills, the South Carolina budget is treated as a single entity , and 
considered as a single General Appropriations Bill. The department request , in 
addition to the BCB recommendation, is included in the document. Passage in the 
House of Representatives is followed by consideration in the Senate , where the bill is 
assigned to the Committee on Finance. As with other legislation , a Conference 
Committee attempts to iron out any House/Senate differences. The normal considera-
tion period for the bill is four to five months after its submission (usually in January ) 
though provisions exist for the passage of continuing resolutions in the event that 
debate has not ended by the beginning of the new fiscal year. Indicative of the broad 
formal powers of the BCB is the fact that all legislative appropriations are considered 
'maximums ' and are subject to reduction by the BCB if that body has evidence to 
suggest that revenue collections are falling below revenue estimates , and that con-
tinued spending at appropriated levels would result in a budget deficit. 7 Figure 1 
describes the chronology of South CaroHna's budget process. 
While narratives and flow charts are useful in helping us to understand the 
fundamentals of the state budgeting, we seek to go beyond these descriptions to 
answer questions on a number of fronts . It is important , for example, for us to know if 
the State Budget and Control Board has in reality the influence in budgeting matters 
that its statutory authorities would indicate. It is also important to know how much (if 
• Use of the term 'counterpart" may be too strong here. [n many ways, BCB and 0MB are very different 
organisms . 0MB is, of course , an exclusively executive agency, with a Director appointed by the President and 
a large professional staff. It has functions which BCB does not (e.g., legislative clearance ), and it lacks some of 
the powers and functional responsibilities which BCB possesses (e.g. , personnel and retirement policies). 
8 The other four Divisions of the Budget and Control Board are General Services, Personnel, State 
Retirement , and a new division concerned with supervision and control of the State's motor vehicles . 
7 The similarity between this situation and that of Presidential "impoundment" at the federal level is 
obvious , but the differences between the two situations deserves some comment. The crncial difference, from 
the point of view of political conflict , is that BCB"s actions at the state level are not as threatening to the 
legislature since the legislature is represented on BCB itself - a situation which, of course , does not obtain 
when a President, in concern with 0MB , decides to impound Congressionally appropriated funds. 
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any) influence is exerted over the budget by the state legislature. Perhaps most of all, it 
is important to understand the role which the executive departments' own budgeting 
strategies play in their eventual budgetary success. If the final budget outcome is 
viewed, as we consider it here , as the 'dependent' variable, it is important to under-
stand which of the host of ' independent' variables affecting it are most influential in 
determining its eventual shape and size. 
Agency Acqu-isitiveness, BCB Support for Expansion, 
and Agency Budget Expansion Success 
For good or ill , one of the most significant characteristics of state budgets in recent 
year has been their steadily increasing size. 8 This growth in the magnitude of state 
budgets is frequently a major concern of citizens and their elected officials. Budgetar-y 
growth is also a matter of great importance to state agencies which are concerned with 
their own funding levels and which usually demonstrate a desire for continued 
growth. 9 With these considerations in mind, we have adopted agency budget expan-
sion success as the dependent variable for this study . By focusing on budget expansion 
success, we have selected a variable which is of importance to a wide variety of political 
and governmental actors. 
Agency budget expansion success refers to the degree to which an agency is 
successful in obtaining a higher level offunding for the coming budget period that the 
agency enjoyed in the previous budget year. For the purposes of this study , budget 
expansion success is defined as the percentage of the current year's budget appropri-
ated by the legislature for the coming budget period. A budget expansion success score 
of 110 would mean that the legislature appropriated 110 percent of the previous year 's 
expenditure level for the particular agency examined. 
While the final determination of agency budget expansion success is made by the 
legislature , studies of the budgetary process in the American states indicate that 
legislative decisions are influenced substantially by non-legislative actors such as 
specialized budget review groups and individual state agencies. 10 Two factors which 
have been found to affect legislative decisions substantially are the type of budget 
strategy adopted by individual agencies and gubernatorial support for agency budget 
expansion . Given the thrust of these prior research efforts , an examination of the 
degree to which agency budget expansion success in South Carolina is associated with 
these two variables appears to be a logical point at which to begin an examination of the 
South Carolina budgeta1-y process. 
In submitting a budget request , state agencies may pursue strategies ranging from 
conservative requests only slightly higher than their previous appropriations to ac-
quisitive requests substantially higher than their past levels offunding. Operationally , 
agency acquisitiveness is defined as the agency's request for the coming budget period 
as a percentage of current expenditures . A score of 130 on this index indicates that the 
agency requested 130 percent of its current expenditures for the approaching budget 
period or an increase of 30 percent. 
The bulk of research concerned with the budgetary process has emphasized the 
efficacy of acquisitive budget strategies for the achievement of budget expansion 
8 In 1969, state government expenditures from their own funds totaled 12.9 billion dollars . By 1974, 
estimated state i:overnment expenditures from their own funds had reached 81.0 billion dollars . See Advisory 
Council on Intergovernmental Relations , Trends in Fiscal Federalism, 1954-1974, February , 1975, p. 17. 
9 See Deil S. Wright . "Executive Leadership in State Administration ." Midwest journal of Political 
Science , 11 (February, 1967), pp . 1-26. 
1° For a comparative state analysis of the impact of non-legislative actors on legislative budget decisions , 
see Ira Sharkansky , "Agency Requests , Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures ," 
American Political Science Review , 62 (December , 1968). pp. 1220-1231. 
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success. 11 The general finding is that while acquisitive budget requests are subjected 
to relatively severe short-term cuts, the magnitude of those cuts is not sufficient to 
reduce the growth rates of acquisitive agencies to the levels realized by nonacquisitive 
agencies . In terms of budget expansion success , the existing literature indicates that 
the acquisitive agency is in an advantageous position. 
Once agency requests have been made and agency budget strategy determined , 
the budgetary process usuaJly provides for a review of agency requests by an inter-
mediate actor. As discussed earlier, the Budget and Conh·ol Board plays this inter-
mediate role in South Carolina. For a wide variety of reasons , the recommendations of 
a specialized, professional budget review agency such as BCB can be expected to have 
a strong influence on the final decisions of the South Carolina legislature. State budget 
documents are highly complex and confront decision-makers with difficult decisions. 
In such an atmosphere of uncertainty and complexity, legislators naturally look for 
convenient decision cues or reference points in their attempts to ease the task of 
decision-making. 12 The recommendations of BCB offer legislators these important 
reference points. As a result , it is logical to expect legislative support for agency budget 
expansion to be influenced at least to some degree by the extent of BCB support for 
expansion. BCB support for expansion is defined as the BCB's recommendation for an 
agency as a percentage of the agency's existing appropriations level. A score of 105 on 
this index indicates that the BCB recommended 105 percent of the current operating 
budget for the coming fiscal period or an increase of 5 percent. 
Fortunately , South Carolina budget documents supply the data essential for this 
analysis. State budget records provide current expenditure data by agency, including 
the original budget requests for each agency , the amount recommended for each 
agency by BCB, and the sum appropriated by the legislature. 
The data for th.is analysis are drawn from the budget years 1969-1970 through 
1975-1976. Thirty state agencies were selected for study. 13 A number of criteria were 
used to select the agencies included in the analysis. An attempt was made to include all 
agencies which had existed without major structural changes throughout the period of 
the study and which had received relatively substantial state appropriations. In addi-
tion, the selection process was designed to insure that representatives of a number of 
11 See Sbarkansky , Ibid. ; Ira Sharkansky and Augustus Turnbull, "Budget-Making in Georgia and Wiscon-
sin: A Testofa Model ," Midwest journal of Political Science, 13 ( ovember, 1969), pp. 631-645; and AndrewT. 
Cowart , Tore Hansen and Karl-Brik Brofoss, "Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision levels in 
the Norwegian Urban Setting ," American Political Science Review, 69 Qune, 1975), pp. 543-558. 
12 The tendency of policy-makers to look for decisional 'cues' to simplify their tasks and help them avoid 
uncertainty is widely discussed in the 'incrementalist' literature, and in the literature dealing with legislative 
behavior. See (for a discussion of the former) Nicos P. Mouzelis, Organization and Bureaucracy (Chicago: 
Aldine, 1972) pp. 120-142. Also see R. M. Cyert and J. C. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Finn , 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall , 1963) pp. 128-48. 
13 The agencies included in the analysis are : Budget and Control Board; Commission on Higher Educa-
tion ; University of South Carolina ; Clemson University ; Medical University of South Carolina ; State Depart-
ment of Education ; State Board for Technical and Comprehensive Education ; Educational Television Commis-
sion; South Carolina Arts Commission; Department of Health and Environmental Control ; State Department 
of Mental Health ; Department of Mental Retardation ; Commission of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse ; Depart-
ment of Social Services ; State Agency of Vocational Rehabilitation ; Children's Bureau; Commission for the 
Blind; Department of Corrections; Probation , Parole and Pardon Board; Water Resources Commission ; State 
Forestry Commission ; Department of Agriculture ; Wildlife and Marine Resources Department ; Department of 
Parks, Recreation and Tourism ; State Development Board; State Dairy Commission; Department of Labor; 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission; Department of Veterans Affairs; and Public Service Commission. 
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types of agencies (education, health , welfare, and natural resources) were included in 
order to permit comparative analysis across agency types. 14 
The initial task of this paper is the de termination of the degree to which legislative 
appropriation decisions in South Carolina are influenced by the two variables men-
tioned above - agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for expansion. By examining 
the explanatory power of agency acquisitiveness and BCB recommendations , it is 
possible to identify the parameters within which the legislature exercises independent 
influence over final budgetary decisions. 
Analysis by Agency Type 
The results of the initial simple correlation analysis by agency type are presented in 
Table One. Focusing on the relationships across all agencies for the entire seven year 
period, one notes that agency acquisitiveness and Budget and Control Board support 
for expansion are associated with agency budget success with the legislature. For the 
1969-1970 to 1975-1976 period across all agencies, the simple correlation between 
agency acquisitiveness and budget expansion success is .29 (significant at the .001 
level). Over the same period , the simple correlation between BCB support for expan-
sion and budget expansion success is .58 (significant at the .001 level ). 
These results seem to indicate that past research findings concerning the influence 
of agency acquisitiveness and executive recommendations over legislative budget 
decisions are applicable to South Carolina. The relationships are positive and in both 
cases are high enough to meet the criterion of statistical significance. As reported in 
earlier studies, 15 the relationship between executive recommendations and budget 
expansion is stronger than the relationship between acquisitiveness and budget expan-
sion success. BCB recommendations appear to influence legislative decisions more 
strongly than agency budget strategies. 
Our interest , however, is not limited to the relationships between these variab les 
for all types of agencies for the entire seven year period covered by this analysis. Tab le 
One also demonstrates that the relationships behveen acquisitiveness , BCB support 
for expansion , and budget expansion success vary depending upon the type of agencies 
being studied. Acquisitiveness and BCB support are associated significantly with 
budget expansion success in most cases and the relationship between BCB support and 
expansion success is stronger than the acquisitiveness-success relationship in all cases. 
The striking feature of Table One , however , is the variation in the strength of these 
relationships across agency types. The simple correlation coefficients for acquisitive-
ness and expansion success range from .27 for natural resource agencies to .67 for 
welfare agencies. The simple correlation coefficients for BCB support and expansion 
success range from .31 for natural resource agencies to .88 for education agencies. 
While the findings reported in Table One generally support the conclusions drawn 
by past research dealing with state budgetary processes , the variation observed in the 
strength of the relationships across agency types points to hvo conclusions: l ) agency 
acquisitiveness may be a more effective strategy for some types of agencies than others, 
and 2) the influence of executive recommendations over legislative budget decisions 
14 Included as education agencies were : Commission on Higher Education ; University of South Carolina ; 
Clemson University : Medical University of South Carolina : State Department of Education ; State Board for 
Technical and Comprehensive Education ; and Educational Television Commission . Included as health agen-
cies were : Department of Health and Environmental Control ; State Department of Mental Health ; and 
Department of Mental Retardation . Included as welfare agencies were : Department of Social Services ; State 
Agency of Vocational Rehabilitation ; Children 's Bureau ; and Commission for the Blind. Included as natural 
resources agencies were: Water Resources Commission; State Forestry Commission ; Department of Agricul-
ture ; Wildlife and Marine Resources Department ; and Department of Parks , Recreation and Tourism. 
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may vary from agency type to agency type . Whil e a study of one state canno t arrive at 
definitiv e answers concerning the genera l app licability of th ese findings or at 
generalizabl e explanations of them, the findings reflected in Table One raise interest-
ing questions worthy of further study and demand that some attempt at explanation be 
made . 
The relatively low correlations between acquisitiveness and expansion success and 
BCB support and expansion success for natural resources agenci es is one of the more 
str iking findings prese nted in Table On e . Compared to the other thr ee types of 
agencies, the two independent variables have relatively ' little relationship to budg et 
expans ion success among natur~ resources agencies. In an attempt to explain this 
anomalous finding, the scores of the natural resources agencies for each of the thr ee 
variables were re-examined. The deviation of these agencies from the general patt ern 
found among the other thr ee types of agencies can be attributed large ly to the unusual 
budgetary circumstances of one agency - the Department of Wildlife and Marin e 
Resources. In thr ee of the seven fiscal yea rs studi ed , this agency's appropriations 
actua lly excee ded the agency's budg et req uests. eedless to say, this is a most unusual 
budgetary eve nt. We can only assume that certain political circumstances - not 
obvious to the researcher condu cting a quantitativ e study of this sort- surround that 
agency and crea te a situation in which the legislatur e fee ls committed to funding the 
agency at unusually high leve ls.16 The commitment of the legislatur e is so strong in this 
regard that it not only acts largely independent ofBCB recommendations , but goes so 
far as to excee d actual agency req ues ts in its final funding decisions . 
In addition to the low relationships found for natural resource agencies, the high 
acqu isitive-s uccess relationship for welfare agencies stands out in Table One. Although 
much of the litera tur e argues that agency acquisitiveness works most successfully for 
agenc ies which have strong leve ls of political support , 17 our analysis indicates other-
wise. South Carolina is certainly not a state known for its support for welfare liberalism . 
(In fact, during the seven year period examined, the state welfare agencies expanded 
their budgets at a rate below the average for the other types of state agencies 
studied. 18) Despit e the lack of support for welfare programs in South Carolina, agency 
acquisi tiveness has its strongest relationship with budg et success among the state's 
welfare agencies. 
Two possible explanations for this finding are offered . First , agencies possessing 
little effective political supp ort may have to be more acquisitive in order to achieve 
even a minimal amount of expan sion. Agencies with substantial political clout can 
expect suppo rt for agency expansion to arise from those interested in and supportive of 
the agency's programs, and thus may not need to push as aggressively in order to 
expand success folly. This interpr etation leads us to conc lude that stronger associations 
15 See Sharkansky , Ibid . 
16 One possible explanation of the legislature's unusual generosity toward the Depa rtmen t ofW ildlife and 
Marine Resources centers around the influence of the Chainnan of the Senate Commit tee on Finance. Prior to 
the passage of a Senate rule limiting members to a single committee, tl1e Chainnan of Senate Finance had been 
the chairman of the aut hor i,,ation committee dealing with the Depar tment of Wildlife and Marine Resources. 
The Chairman has been reported to be an ardent suppor ter of this agency and its activities in his basically rural 
county . In other words, the agency appears to be a "pet" of the Senate's most influential member in the area of 
budgetary decisions . 
17 This contention is made both implicitly and explicitly in the Lltera ture. For explicit examples of the 
argument, see Sharkansky and Turnbull, ibid.; and Ira Sharkansky, "Four Agencies and an Appropriations 
Submittee: A Comparative Study of Budge t Strategies," Midw est j ournal of Political Science, 9 {August , 1965), 
pp . 254-281. 
18 Across the seven year period studi ed, the average welfare agency expanded its budget by 16.8 percent 
compare d to 19.3 percent for natura l resources agencies, 23.4 percent for education agencies, and 25.6 percent 
for health agencies . 
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between acquisitiveness and budget expansi~n success will be found among state 
agencies with low levels of support than among agencies with higher levels of support. 
A second explanation lies in the intergovernmental structure of state welfare programs. 
State politics and budget making does not take place in a vacuum. Federal programs 
and politics substantially influence state policy and politics. This influence is particu-
larly pervasive in the area of welfare policy. Much of the money appropriated by the 
legislature for welfare programs generates additional federal dollars which otherwise 
would not enter the South Carolina economy. In other words, we are suggesting that 
the finding of a high degree of association between acquisitiveness and budget expan-
sion success in state welfare agencies may mean that acquisitive budget strategies work 
more effectively for agencies whose programs generate matching federal dollars than 
for agencies whose programs are financed solely or predominantly by state dollars. 
Our major concern, however, is the degree to which legislative budgetary deci-
sions can be explained by the combined influence of agency acquisitiveness and BCB 
support for expansion. In order to explore this question, the statistical technique of 
multiple coJTelation analysis has been employed. The multiple correlation coefficient 
(R2 or the coefficient of determination) gives us a summary measure of the total amount 
of variation in the dependent variable "explained" by the two independent variables. If 
the R2 's produced are high, we can conclude that the legislature is largely responding 
to agency budget strategies and BCB recommendations rather than acting as an 
independent influence in the South Carolina budget process. On the other hand if the 
independent variables exhibit little explanatory power, we can conclude that the 
legislature is largely independent of these hvo sources of external influence. Our 
assumption is that any variation in the dependent variable (agency budget expansion 
success ) not explained by the independent variables (agency acquisitiveness and BCB 
support for expansion ) results from independent legislative inlluence. 19 
Table Two indicates that the degree to which legislative appropriations decisions 
can be explained by agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for expansion varies 
substantially across agency types. While the two independent variables are able to 
explain 77 percent of the variance in the agency budget success of education agencies, 
the same two variables account for only 12 percent of the variance in the budget success 
of natural resources agencies. These results indicate that independent legislative 
influence is not constant across all types of agencies and is particularly high in the case 
of natural resources agencies. 
These results point to the dangers involved in budgetary analyses which examine 
the relationship between acquisitiveness , executive recommendation , and budget 
expansion success across a sample of state agencies without examining the relationships 
which exist among significant sub-groupings of state agencies. If one were to focus 
attention only on the overall explanatory power of the hvo independent variables 
across all agencies, the coefficient of determination of. 34 would lead one to conclude 
that legislative budget decisions in South Carolina are influenced by agency acquisi-
tiveness and BCB recommendations to a significant degree but that one must look 
elsewhere (perhaps to the legislature itself) in order to explain the remaining 66 
percent of the variance in agency budget expansion success. By examining the relation-
ships behveen acquisitiveness , BCB support , and budget expansion success in sub-
groups of state agencies , however, one quickly notes that this relatively low level of 
19 We recognized that this assumption is problematical. Other extra-legislative variables not included in 
this analysis could well explain the remaining variation in agency budget success . The degree of unexplained 
variance discovered in this analysis, however , can be taken as an indication of the maximum possible legislative 
innuence over agency budget expansion. The amount of legislative influence could of course be less than this 
maximum amount. 
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explanation is largely the result of an exceptionally low level of explanation achieved in 
one particular type of agency sub-group - natural resources agencies. For all other 
types of agencies, the two independent variables explain over 50 percent of the 
variation in agency budget success reaching a high of 77 percent for education agen-
cies. 
To this point , our analysis of the relationship between ·agency acquisitiveness, BCB 
support for expansion, and agency budget expansion success across types of agencies 
leads to the following conclusions: 
1) agency acquisitiveness and BCB recommendations are important influences 
over legislative budgetary decisions ; 
2) BCB recommendations have a greater impact on legislative decisions than 
agency acquisitiveness; 
3) the explanatory power of agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for expansion 
varies considerably across agency types and is particularly low for natural 
resources agencies; 
4) agency acquisitiveness as a budgetary strategy is more effective for some types of 
agencies than for others and is particularly effective for welfare agencies ; 
5) the strong relationship behveen acquisitiveness and budget expansion success 
for welfare agencies may indicate that a) budget expansion success for agencies 
with little political support is more dependent upon agency acquisitiveness 
since little other support can be expected , and/orb) agency acquisitiveness is a 
more productive budget strategy for agencies conducting programs in which 
state appropriations are matched by federal funds; and 
6) budgetary analyses in which attention is focused on the relationships between 
acquisitivenss , executive recommendations, and agency budget expansion suc-
cess across a sample of state agencies may obscure important differences in these 
relationships which exist among significant sub-groupings of state agencies. 
Analysis Across Time 
Our focus on one state makes it easier to extend our analysis across time. This 
section of the study presents the results of a longitudinal analysis of the relationships 
between agency acquisitiveness, BCB support for expansion , and agency budget 
expansion success. 
Table Three demonstrates that the relationships between these key budgetary 
variables are not constant over time. Substantial variation in the magnitude of the 
simple coJTelation coefficients between the hvo independent variables and the depen-
dent variable exists across the seven years included in this analysis. The simple 
correlation for acquisitiveness and budget expansion success ranges from .02 (in 
1971-72 and 1975-76) to . 76 (in 1973-74). Similarly, the simple correlation coefficient 
for BCB support and budget expansion success ranges from .13 (in 1972-73) to .96 (in 
1971-72). 
The results of the multiple correlation analyses for each of the fiscal years (pre-
sented in Table Four) emphasize the year-to-year shift in the explanatory power of the 
two independent variables more effectively. When multiple correlation analyses are 
pe1formed for each of the seven budget years , one finds that the explanatory power of 
the independent variables ranges from a high of. 92 in fiscal year 1971-72 to a low of .33 
in fiscal years 1972-73 and 1974-75. In some years, legislative appropriations appear to 
be dependent largely upon agency budget strategies and BCB recommendations. In 
other years , legislative actions appear to be relatively independent of these influences. 
Generalizations about the extent of influence over budget decisions enjoyed by state 
agencies , the Budget and Control Board, and the legislature, which ignore the dimen-
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sion of time , would appear to be ill advised. Table Four pres ents a rather complicated 
picture of shifting patterns of influence over time and raises some significant and 
interesting questions: Why does the dependency of the legislature on the decisional 
cues provided by agency requests and BCB recommendations vary from year to year? 
Do the years of high dependency on external decision cues have any common features? 
Do the years oflow dependency share common features? At this point , we can arrive at 
some exploratory and tentative answers to these questions. 
A glance at the results of the multiple correlation analysis for all seven years quickly 
reveals that BCB support for expansion is contributing a greater share of the explained 
variation in agency budget success than is agency acquisitiveness (a partial correlation 
coefficient of .53 compared to a partial of .08). A further look at Table Four reveals that 
in three fiscal periods (1969-70, 1972-73 , and 1974-75) the independent variables 
combined explain less than 50 percent of the variation in agency budget success. In 
these years, one might expect to find lower leve ls of explanatory effectiveness for both 
of the independent variables. Table Four demonstrates that this is not the case. The 
explanatory power of agency acquisitiveness is generally high er in these three fiscal 
years. On the other hand , a consistent pattern of substantially weaker relationships 
between BCB support and agency budget success is evident. In other words, we can 
more accurately say that these years represent periods in which the legislature is 
unusually non-responsive to the budgetary recommendations of BCB and slightly 
more responsive to agency bu·dgetary strategies. 
To this point , we have noted substantial variation in the ability of agency acqu .isi-
tiveness and BCB support for expansion to explain agency budget success in the 
legislature . We have also discovered that this variation is attributable to year-to-year 
changes in the responsiveness of the legislature to the recommendations ofBCB. Our 
attention now turns to the question of whether the years in which high explanatory 
effectiveness is achieved are in any way different from the other years included in the 
analysis. 
The four flscal periods in which agency acquisitiveness and BCB support for 
expansion account for over 50 percent of the variation in agency budget expansion are 
also years in which agency budget expansion success falls below the average for the 
total seven year period . For the seven year period, the average agency increased its 
budget by 19.6 percent over the previous year's expenditure level. For the four years 
in which the legislature was most dependent upon external decision cues, the average 
agency budget increased by only 10.8 percent. In the three years characterized by low 
dependency on external decision cues, the average agency budget increased by 31.6 
percent . There is evidence then to suggest that budgetary decisions of the legislature 
are less dependent upon BCB recommendations in relatively "good" budget years, 
i.e. , years in which the state budget expands at a more rapid than normal pace. 
The legislature's greater relative independence from the recommendations ofBCB 
in "good" budget years can be explained by the traditional budgetary roles ofBCB and 
the legislature. For the seven year period examined, the average agency request was 
for 38.1 percent increase over the past year's funding level. Over the same period, the 
BCB recommended an average increase of only 10.2 percent. The legislature actually 
appropriated an average increase of 19.6 percent. Thus the usual budget pattern is for 
the legislature to appropriate less than the amount requested by the agency but more 
than the amount recommended by BCB . Years in which the legislature is more 
successful in restoring such cuts are years in which budget expansion is relatively high 
and years in which the legislature is less mindful of BCB recommendations. 
Given South Carolina's constitutional prohibition against deficit spending, the 
influence of the legislature in the budgetary process is largely dependent upon the 
revenue forecasts for the upcoming year. If incoming revenues appear available, the 
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legislature can restore BCB cuts with relative ease and play a major independent role 
in the budgetary process. Lean state revenue forecasts restrict the discretion of the 
legislature in restoring BCB cuts and make the legislature increasingly dependent 
upon the budget recommendations of BCB. In addition, BCB traditionally estimates 
revenue forecasts conservatively in order to insure that state spending will not exceed 
state revenue. Since BCB recommendations are made at an earlier point in the budget 
process, later revenue projections are usually higher than the initial estimates used by 
BCB. These higher revenue projections enable the legislature to distribute these 
"additional" revenues to state agencies in addition to the original estimates ofBCB. If 
state revenue projections remain the same or decline, the legislature can only restore 
one agency's budget cuts by taking an equivalent amount of dollars from the budgets of 
another agency or group of agencies. Given the controversy which surrounds such 
decisions "to rob Peter in order to pay Paul ," it is not surprising that the legislature 
generally opts to follow the original BCB recommendations in lean budget years. 
Our analysis of the influence of agency budget sh·ategies, BCB recommendations, 
and legislative appropriations across time leads to the following conclusions: 
1) the dependency of the legislature on the decision cues provided by state 
agencies and BCB varies considerably over time ; 
2) this variation in legislative dependence upon external decision cues is largely 
the result of vaiying legislative dependence on BCB recommendations; 
3) variation in legislative dependence upon BCB recommendations is associated 
with variation in the rate of growth in the state budget, i.e., years in which the 
state budget expands at a higher than normal rate are years in which the 
legislature is influenced to a lesser degree by the decisions of BCB; 
4) the combination of the legislature's role as a restorer of BCB recommended 
·budget cuts and the state's constitutional injunction against deficit spending 
means that the legislature can more easily play an independent role in the 
budgetary process in those yeai·s in which anticipated revenues appear to be 
relatively ample in relation to agency requests and in which later revenue 
projections ai·e higher than the earlier projections utilized by BCB. 
Summary 
A number of conclusions , or observations, ai·e appropriate in light of the analysis 
this paper has attempted. Most immediately, it is apparent to us that factors both 
internal and external to state agencies affect their relative success in expanding their 
budgets. Both agency acquisitiveness (an internal factor, in this context) and BCB 
support (an external factor) appeai· to be associated with budget expansion success. In 
selected years, legislative support (also an external factor) seems to be important. 
Awareness of the impo1tance of agency acquisitiveness as a determinai1t of an agency's 
budget success should free us from the notion that agencies' budgets are solely 
dependent vai·iables, whose sizes and shapes are determined by forces external to the 
agencies themselves. While the agency's final budget is, of course, a dependent 
vai·iable in this context, we must remember that one of the independent variab les 
responsible for shaping it may well be the budgeting strategy adopted by the agency 
itself. 
Our analysis sheds some light, we feel, on literature previously published on state 
government budgeting. Most impo1tant, it uncovers significant yeai·-to-yeai·, and 
agency-to-agency differences in the extent to which South Carolina conforms to the 
model developed by Sharkansky to explain influence patterns in state budgeting. As 
Tables Two and Four noted, the combined explanatory power of agency acquisitive-
ness and BCB support differs considerably from year to year, and from agency-type to 
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agency-type, indicating that the South Carolina budgetary process is not a static 
phenomenon susceptible to easy categorization. This finding, it would seem , illus-
trates the complexity of state budgeting and calls into question typologies of state 
budgeting processes which are based on single year observations and which treat all 
state agencies as a single category. 
A final conclusion concerns the considerable utility of the case study approach in 
attempting to examine the budgetary processes of the states. No look at South Caro li-
na's budgetary process could be complete or accurate without an awareness of the 
constitutional and institutional contexts in which that process takes place . Without 
such an awareness , for example , we would not have been able to understand the 
connection between revenue estimates and the extent of independent legislative 
influence over budgetary decisions . Budget-maldng , like other forms of policy-
making , occurs in and is affected by an environment. The case study approach is an 
approach well suited to create an awareness of that environment's importance. 
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With BCB assistance (and in 
light of BCB revenue estimates) 
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TABLE ONE. Coefficients of Simple Corre-
lation Between Agency 
Budget Expansion Success 
and the Independent Vari• 
ables , by Type of Agency 
Typ e of Agency BCB Supp ort 
Agency Acqui sitiveness f or Expan sion 
All Age ncies .29"'** .58*** 
Edu cation .47*** .88*** 
Health .43* . 73*** 
Welfare .67*** .82*** 
Natural 
Resources .27 .31* 
••• = Significant at .001 level. 
• = Significant at .05 leve l. 
TABLE TWO. Results of Multiple Correla-






BCB Support .58*** 
Multipl e Corr elation Coefficient 
Coefficient of Determin ation 
Edu cation Agencies 
Variabl e Simpl e 
Acqui sitiveness .47*** 
BCB Support .88*** 
Multipl e Corr elation Coefficient 
Coefficient of Determin ation 
Health Agencies 
Variab le Simpl e 
Acqui sitiveness .43* 
BCB Support . 73*** 
Multipl e Correlation Coefficient 
Coe fllcient of Determination 
Welfare Agencies 
Variabl e Simpl e 
Acqui sitiveness .67*** 
BCB Supp ort .82*** 
Multipl e Correlation Coefllcient 
Coe fficient of Determin ation 





















Variabl e Simpl e Partial 
Acqui siti eness .27 .15 
BCB Supp ort .31 * .23 
Multipl e Correlation Coefllcient .34 
Coefficient of Determin ation . 12 
*"* = Significant at the .001 leve l. 
•• = Significant at the .OJ leve l. 
• = Significant at the .05 level. 
TABLE THREE. Coefficients of Simple Cor-
relation Between Agency 
Budget Expansion Success 
and the Independent Vari-
ables , by Year 



















••• = Significant at .001 level. 




TABLE FOUR. Results of Multiple Correla-
tion Analysis, by Year 
All Years 
Variabl e Simpl e 
Acquisitiveness .29*** 
BCB Supp ort .58*** 
Multipl e Correlation Coefficient 
Coefficient of D eterminati on 
1969-1970 
Variabl e Simpl e 
Acquisitiveness .49"'** 
BCB Supp ort .65*** 
Mu I ti pie Corr elation Coefficient 
Coe fficient of Determin ation 
1970-1971 
Variabl e Simpl e 
Acqui sitiveness .35* 
BCB Supp ort .83*** 
Multipl e Correlation Coefficient 
Coe fficient of Detenninati on 
1971-1972 
Variabl e Simple 
Acquisitiveness .02 
BCB Supp or t .96*** 
Multipl e Correlation Coe fficient 
Coe fficient of Determin ation 
Variabl e 
Acqui sitiveness 





Multipl e Correlation Coefficient 






























Acquisitiveness . 76*** 
BCB Support .86*** 
Multiple Correlation Coefficient 




BCB Support .56*** 
~ultiple Correlat ion Coefficient 














BCB Support .72*** 
Multipl e Correlation Coefficient 
Coefficient of Det ermination 
••• = Signific-ant at the .001 level. 
** = Signiflcant ~t the .OJ leve l. 
• = Signiflcant at the .05 level. 
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Partial 
-.09 
.72*** 
.72 
.52 
